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Notes and Comments
TAXATION OF EASEMENTS IN AIRSPACE
Macht v. Department of Assessments of Baltimore City1
In 1961, when Baltimore's Charles Center was in the early
stages of development, the Charles Street Development Corpora-
tion was planning the construction of a high rise office building
on the southeast corner of Charles and Fayette Streets, now
known as the Blaustein Building. The adjacent land immediately
to the east of the Blaustein Building site was owned by Morton
Macht and improved by a small five-story building known as the
Macht Building. Since the plan for the Blaustein Building called
for windows on all four sides of the new tower, the Charles Street
Development Corporation was concerned that the Macht Build-
ing might be replaced by a taller structure, thereby blocking the
Blaustein Building's eastern exposure.
In order to avoid such an occurrence, a lease was entered into
on March 24, 1961, between Morton Macht, as lessor, and the
Charles Street Development Corporation, as lessee, providing for
the rental of a prescribed block of airspace above the Macht
Building, located at 11-13 East Fayette Street, for a term of 98
years and nine months, beginning on April 1, 1961, without provi-
sion for extension or renewal, but with an option to purchase at
the end of the term and the right of first refusal throughout the
term. The rent is computed at twice the annual real estate taxes
imposed on the entire property at 11-13 East Fayette Street being
"land, improvements and airspace," less any increase in taxes
resulting from improvements made by the Machts. The lease also
contained the express covenant that during the term, the lessee
would not use the air space for any purpose other than light and
air.'
When the Department of Assessments of Baltimore City be-
came aware of the lease of March 24, 1961, they viewed it as a
potential source of tax revenue for Baltimore City. The approach
1. 266 Md. 602, 296 A.2d 162 (1972).
2. Lease and Agreement between Morton Macht, Lessor, and Charles Street Devel-
opment Corporation, Lessee, dated March 24, 1961, reproduced in Joint Record Extract
at E. 59, Macht v. Department of Assessments, 266 Md. 602, 296 A.2d 162 (1972).
For background on the Charles Center project see Millspaugh, Baltimore Charles
Center, A Case Study of Downtown Renewal, Technical Bulletin No. 51, Urban Land
Institute (Nov. 1964).
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of the Department of Assessments was simply that a new income-
producing element of real property was created by the lease, and
as such it ought to be added to the tax rolls.3
The Department first directed that notice of assessment be
sent to the Charles Street Development Corporation, the lessee
of the air rights. The lessee appealed this assessment to the Board
of Municipal and Zoning Appeals,4 which in an order dated May
26, 1965, reversed the assessment and directed the Department
to enter its assessment against the fee owner, Macht. Macht, the
lessor and fee owner, appealed to the Maryland Tax Court, where
the assessment was struck down on the grounds that Macht had
been denied his right to a proper and complete hearing before the
Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals.'
On November 30, 1967, the Department of Assessments
transmitted a final notice to the Machts assessing the "Air Rights
Only" at 11-13 East Fayette Street at $50,700 for the fiscal year
1968-69. The assessment was arrived at through the "capitaliza-
tion of income" method of assessment which was applied to the
air rights only.' The remainder of the property at 11-13 East
Fayette Street was assessed at the same rate per square foot as
3. The response of John G. Arthur, Director of the Department of Assessments of
Baltimore City, to the question "What was the basis of your assessing the concept of air
rights?", asked on direct examination by counsel for Baltimore City at the hearing before
the Maryland Tax Court, is indicative of the City's approach:
A. My basis was that we discovered this lease which provided for rental for
the air space. It was our feeling that this was part of the bundle of rights which
attaches to the ownership of any real estate; and for that reason it was our opinion
that there was a value at 11/13 East Fayette Street which was occasioned by this
lease which would make the property more valuable than other properties in the
block.
Joint Record Extract at E. 24, Macht v. Department of Assessments, 266 Md. 602, 296
A.2d 162 (1972).
4. The scheme of real property tax appeals for a Baltimore City taxpayer as set forth
in MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §§ 255-256, 229 (1969), provides for four possible steps: first, a
hearing before the Department of Assessments of Baltimore City; second, an appeal to
the Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals; third, an appeal to the Maryland Tax Court;
and fourth, a direct appeal from the Tax Court to the Court of Appeals. Section 229, as
amended, no longer requires an appeal from the Maryland Tax Court to the circuit court
level prior to the right of appeal to the Court of Appeals.
5. For details of the early proceedings in the case see Trustees v. Department of
Assessment, Appeal No. 1013-68/69 (Bd. of Municipal and Zoning Appeals of Baltimore
City, April 16, 1969).
6. Testimony of John G. Arthur, Director of the Department of Assessments of
Baltimore City, before the Maryland Tax Court, in response to a question about the
methods used to assess air rights: ". . . I think the basis of [the assessment] normally
would be the capitalization of income because I don't know of any that have been
[assessed differently] -the income is the sole factor .. " Joint Record Extract at E.
27, Macht v. Department of Assessments, 266 Md. 602, 296 A.2d 162 (1972).
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the property immediately to the east.'
The Machts then appealed this assessment to the Board of
Municipal and Zoning Appeals, which, on April 16, 1969, entered
an order reversing the action of the Department of Assessments.'
The basis of this reversal was that the Department of Assess-
ments had no authority to assess "Air Rights Only" as property
separate and distinct from all other interests in the real property
to which such air rights pertain, because such an assessment
amounts to the creation of a new classification of taxable real
property, a function reserved to the state legislature according to
Article 15 of the Declaration of Rights of Maryland.9
The Department of Assessments of Baltimore City appealed
the order of the Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals to the
Maryland Tax Court."0 The Tax Court, in an opinion and order
filed December 16, 1971, overturned the order of the Board of
7. See Deposition of Max L. Cohen, Senior Assessor, Department of Assessments of
Baltimore City, Joint Record Extract at E. 92, Macht v. Department of Assessments, 266
Md. 602, 296 A.2d 162 (1972).
8. See Trustees v. Department of Assessments, Appeal No. 1013-68/69 (Board of
Municipal and Zoning Appeals of Baltimore City, April 16, 1969).
9. The Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals of Baltimore City explained that:
The City of Baltimore derives its taxing authority, as do the other political subdivi-
sions of the State, from Article 81 of the Annotated Code of Maryland. . . . Article
81 was obviously enacted by the Legislature in accordance with the authority con-
ferred upon it by Article 15 of the Declaration of Rights. The power and duty
imposed upon the General Assembly to "provide for the separate assessment, classi-
fication and subclassification of land, improvements on land and personal property
as it may deem proper..., and further that ". . . all taxes . . . levied shall be
uniform within each class or sub-class of land, improvements on land and personal
property which the respective taxing powers may have directed to be subject to the
tax levy .. "
We have no doubt but that the General Assembly of Maryland can enact
legislation providing for the assessment and taxation of "Air Rights," separate and
apart from other rights held by the owner in land. However, the Legislature has not
chosen to provide for the assessment and taxation of "Air Rights" separate and
apart from other rights, and consequently since it has not, the political subdivisions
have no power granted to them to create this classification or any other classifica-
tion not authorized by the Legislature. See State Tax Commission v. Wakefield,
222 Md. 543, 161 A.2d 676, and Supervisor of Assessments for Montgomery County
v. Alsop, 232 Md. 188, 192 A.2d 494.
Trustees v. Department of Assessments, Appeal No. 1013-68/69 (Bd. of Municipal and
Zoning Appeals of Baltimore City, April 16, 1969).
10. The Maryland Tax Court, an administrative body which functions in a quasi-
judicial fashion, consists of five judges appointed by the Governor, only two of which are
required to be members of the bar. Mn. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 224 (Supp. 1972). The
Maryland Tax Court is empowered to ". . . assess anew, classify anew, abate, modify,
change or alter any valuation, assessment, classification, tax or final orders appealed from,
provided that in the absence of any affirmative evidence to the contrary or of any error
apparent on the face of the proceedings, the assessment, classification or order appealed
from shall be affirmed." MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §§ 224, 229(h) (1969).
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Municipal and Zoning Appeals, thereby upholding the assess-
ment."
The Machts then appealed the order of the Maryland Tax
Court to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, which affirmed the
action of the Maryland Tax Court, in an opinion filed November
8, 1972.12 In so doing, the Court of Appeals did little more than
elaborate upon the reasoning of the Tax Court. There was, how-
ever, a strong dissenting opinion by Judge Barnes, criticizing not
only the result reached by the majority, but its reasoning as well.
Judge Singley, writing for the majority, began by posing the
basic issue to be decided as "[a]re there circumstances where air
space superjacent to real property may be made the subject of a
separate assessment on which state and local real estate taxes can
be levied?"' 3 In so wording the issue, the court laid the foundation
for its opinion affirming an assessment and taxation of air space
separately from all other interests in fee in a case where the entire
fee interest, including the air space, is held by one owner.
In a brief introductory statement of the legal principles of air
space as an incident to the ownership of land, the court quoted
its holding in Friendship Cemetery v. Baltimore4 that "[tihe
landowner owns at least as much of the space above the ground
as he can occupy or use in connection with the land."' 5 The court
then explained that "the owner of the land in fee holds all the
complex elements of a single right, a bundle of sticks, if you will,
which include not only the right to use the surface, but so much
of the superjacent air space as he can use. . . ",'s The court thus
took the initial position that air space is incidental to, not sepa-
rate from, the ownership of land in fee simple. However, in the
subsequent three sections of its opinion upholding the challenged
assessment of "Air Rights Only" as an entity separate and dis-
tinct from any other interest in fee, the court was curiously incon-
sistent with its initial discussion of air rights as "incidental" to
the ownership of land. The court's holding in Macht may be
summarized in its own words that ". . . we see no reason why
land, improvements and air space could not be separately valued
11. Department of Assessments v. Trustees, Case No. 637 (Maryland Tax Court,
December 16, 1971), reproduced in Joint Record Extract at E. 13, Macht v. Department
of Assessments, 266 Md. 602, 296 A.2d 162 (1972).
12. Macht v. Department of Assessments, 266 Md. 602, 296 A.2d 162 (1972).
13. 266 Md. at 604, 296 A.2d at 164.
14. 197 Md. 610, 81 A.2d 57 (1951).
15. 197 Md. at 622, 81 A.2d at 62.
16. 266 Md. at 605, 296 A.2d at 164.
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for assessment purposes, so long as the sum of the elements did
not exceed the value of the whole."' 7
When The Sunday Sun reported on the development of the
Macht case'8 at the time of the Maryland Tax Court's decision,
it implied that the case represented a unique attempt on the part
of a taxing authority to assess and tax a property owner on his
own air rights as an income-producing entity, separate and dis-
tinct from all other interests in the fee.'9 Such a result appeared
to be a further extension of the theory of air rights taxation, the
major works on which discuss the problems which arise when a
landowner conveys his air rights to a developer, that is, how to
compel the taxing authority to recognize the existence of two
separate tax lots in the same fee and apportion the value of the
land to the grantor and the value of the air rights to the devel-
oper.20 Stated in other words, the problem is how to properly tax
the air rights to the developer without taxing the grantor on some-
thing which is no longer his.2' The Macht case, however, presents
a very different problem because it is not a case of two separate
owners of taxable real property in what was formerly a single tax
lot. Instead, it is a case of two taxpayers with separate interests
in a segment of one tax lot.
This distinction between the Macht case and the more com-
mon case of air rights taxation was never clearly established by
the Court of Appeals because of a confusion of terms. Throughout
all of the proceedings and appeals which attended the efforts of
the Department of Assessments to assess and tax someone on the
17. 266 Md. at 610, 296 A.2d at 167.
18. Sunday Sun (Baltimore), March 19, 1972, § F (Real Estate), at 1.
19. "'The Maryland Tax Court ruling in the matter may be unique in American
law,' says John G. Arthur, city assessor. The court reversed the city zoning board in saying
the rights were taxable. It also established for the first time that 'air rights are a valuable
part of real estate,' says Mr. Arthur." Id. The remarks of the city assessor, now a judge of
the Maryland Tax Court, may be somewhat of an overstatement. The instant case may
be unique, but not because it recognizes air rights as a valuable part of real estate. For a
discussion of the recognized value of air rights to real estate see Note, Conveyance and
Taxation of Air Rights, 64 COL. L. REv. 338 (1964). If the Macht case is unique, it is
because it is the first time a court has suggested that an incidental element of real property
ownership may be assessed and taxed separately from all other interests in fee, absent any
statutory authority, and in spite of any value consequences to the remaining interets.
20. See, e.g., 64 COL. L. REv. 338, 350 (1964).
21. 64 COL. L. REv. 338, 351 n. 94 states that: "A detailed discussion of the taxation
of the subjacent owner is beyond the scope of this Note .. ", indicating that any discus-
sion of the taxation of the air space contained in the Note has applicability only to the
tax problems of the superjacent owner. Yet, both the Maryland Tax Court and the Court
of Appeals cited the note in question as authority for tax treatment of Macht, the subja-
cent land owner.
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income-producing entity created by the lease of 1961, no attempt
was made to distinguish the air rights, as the subject of the lease,
from the legal entity created by the lease. Furthermore, the legal
entity created by the lease was never conclusively identified.22 As
a result, a clear answer as to the proper tax treatment of the
entity created by the lease never emerged.
THE INTEREST CREATED By THE LEASE
The language of the lease of March 24, 1961 specified air
rights as the leasehold interest,23 and the Department of Assess-
ments, as well as the Maryland Tax Court followed that lead. The
authorities cited by the Maryland Tax Court were all articles on
air rights.24 Only at the end of its opinion did the Tax Court
22. The Court of Appeals suggested that "[alIthough the Macht's agreement with
the Blaustein Building took the form of a lease, we prefer to regard the rights of the parties
. as most closely resembling those which would exist under a negative easement for
a term of years, .... " 266 Md. at 612, 296 A.2d at 168. However, the court added, "[tihe
City says that the rent reserved makes the arrangement more closely analogous to a profit
a prendre . . . . It might be argued, too, that the agreement is more closely akin to a
license." Id. These two statements are not only contradictory, but evidence a basic disre-
gard for the valuation consequences that can be infered from a correct identification of
the entity created by the lease. For example, "[a] profit a prendre is a right or power to
take from another's land a part of the soil, or of the products of the soil . . . . A right of
profit a prendre may be either appurtenant to land or in gross." TIFFANY, OUTLINES OF REAL
PROPERTY at 343 (1929). The assessor's task is very different if the profit a prendre is
appurtenant to land or if it is in gross. In the former case, it would not only have a
diminishing effect on the value of the servient land, but may enhance the value of the
dominant land to which it is appurtenant. Cf. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 509(2), com-
ments d and e (1944). In the latter case, it would still diminish the value of the servient
land, but, since an incorporeal right in gross means that it benefits a person rather than
dominant land, ". .. that is, they may be held by one independently of his ownership of
other land, ... " [TIFFANY, OUTLINES OF REAL PROPERTY, at 344 (1929)], there are no
considerations of value consequences to dominant land. A license, on the other hand,
presents an entirely different situation. "It is said ... that a license 'passeth no interest,
nor alters or transfers property in anything, but only makes an action lawful which,
without it, had been unlawful....'" TIFFANY, OUTLINES OF REAL PROPERTY at 308-9
(1929). In other words, a license gives the licensee a positive right to do something;
therefore, the agreement between Macht and Blaustein, which gives Blaustein a negative
right, that is Macht's agreement not to use the airspace, can hardly be called a license.
For real property assessment purposes, a license would probably be ignored since it passes
no interest. However, what ever the definition of the entity created by the lease between
Blaustein and Macht, it is essential that that entity be properly and conclusively defined,
because the tax treatment of the properties in question brings the nature of the entity to
which they are subject.
23. Lease and Agreement between Morton Macht, Lessor, and Charles Street Devel-
opment Corporation, Lessee, dated March 24, 1961, reproduced in Joint Record Extract
at E. 59, Macht v. Department of Assessments, 266 Md. 602, 296 A.2d 162 (1972).
24. See 52 Op. MD. Arr'Y GEN. 425 (1967); LEYDEN, Appraisal of Air Rights, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISING 752 (1968); Conveyance and Taxation of Air
Rights, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 338 (1964).
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attempt to identify the entity created by the lease, and then it
only went so far as to say that these air rights could be analogized
to easements appurtenant.2" The Tax Court did not then explain
how an easement appurtenant should be treated for real property
tax purposes. The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, suggested
a negative easement as a possible identity for the entity created
by the lease, and even briefly suggested some principles for the
tax treatment of easements."6 However, the Court suggested that
such principles were only applicable to a consideration of the
amount, not the method of assessment."7
The problem with the failure to distinguish between the sub-
ject of the lease as air rights, and the legal entity created by the
lease is that it led the parties, the Tax Court and, to some extent,
the Court of Appeals to rely upon inappropriate authority. Specif-
ically, both courts fell into the tempting trap of citing authority
which asserts that air rights are independent units of real prop-
erty.28 What the courts failed to integrate into the facts of the
25. Department of Assessments v. Trustees, Case No. 637 (Maryland Tax Court,
December 16, 1971), reproduced in Joint Record Extract at E. 13, Macht v. Department
of Assessments, 266 Md. 602, 296 A.2d 162 (1972). In support of the contention that
easements appurtenant are taxable, the Maryland Tax Court cited 64 COLUM. L. REv. at
352 (1964) where that note discussed the taxation of air rights conveyed in fee to a
superjacent owner prior to development of the inspace. As explained in note 21, supra,
any discussion of the taxation of air space contained in that note has applicability only
to the tax problems of the superjacent owner. Macht is the subjacent owner.
26. 266 Md. at 614-15, 296 A.2d at 168-69.
27. Imniediately following its statement of principles of assessment applicable to
real property subject to easements, the court stated:
[i]t should be remembered that this case reaches us in an unusual posture.
The taxpayer's attack is levelled at the method by which valuation for tax purposes
was reached, and not at the amount of the assessment. If the Machts can demon-
strate that the sum of the values separately attributable to land, improvements and
airspace exceeds the figure at which the property should have been assessed as a
whole, . . . relief may be available.
Id. at 614, 296 A.2d at 169.
28. The Tax Court began its "Conclusions of Law," as follows:
Prior to considering the merits of this specific case, certain elementary principles
in respect to air rights or air space should be resolved. "Air rights are an indepen-
dent unit of real property, comprising a portion of the complete free interest in
land." LEYDEN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REAL ESTATE APPRAIsING (1963) pp. 550-559. "Air
Rights are an independent unit of real property created through the horizontal
subdivision of real estate." Note, Conveyance and Taxation of Air Right, 64 COL.
L.R. 338." The landowner's rights to use and develop the air space above his land
is well established in Maryland . . . the modern trend is to recognize air space as
an indepent unit of real property, the owner of which is entitled to all the rights
provided with and ownership . . . it appears that the prevailing authority would
allow air space to be conveyed, leased, subdivided, have interest created in it and
estates carved out of it in the same manner as land." 520 A.G. 425.
Department of Assessments v. Trustees, Case No. 637 (Maryland Tax Court, December
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Macht case was that such assertions are only applicable to air
rights which have been conveyed away by the holder of the subja-
cent tract.29 To say that air rights which have not been conveyed
away, but merely leased, as in Macht, are independent units of
real property is contrary to the development of the law of real
property from the ancient common law to present times.3" What,
in essence, occurred was a double confusion. The courts, in failing
to distinguish between the subject of the lease and the legal entity
created by the lease, ended up treating them as one and the same,
that is, air rights. The result was that the courts turned to author-
ity on air rights taxation which deals only with the taxation of
conveyed air rights as independent units of real property. Thus
the Court of Appeals holding that air rights, which have been
leased may be assessed and taxed as independent units of real
property is based, in part, upon authority which asserts that only
air rights which have been conveyed in fee to a party other than
the owner of the subjacent land are independent units of real
16, 1971), reproduced in Joint Record Extract at E. 13, Macht v. Department of Assess-
ments, 266 Md. 602, 296 A.2d 162 (1972).
The Court of Appeals quoted 52 Op. ATT'y GEN. 425, 426 (Md. 1967), which states in
pertinent part: ". . . The modern trend is to recognize airspace as an 'independent unit
of real property'; the owner of which is entitled to all the rights associated with land
ownership. [Note] 64 Columbia Law Rev. 338 (1964)." 266 Md. at 613, 296 A.2d at 168.
29. Each of the authorities cited in note 28 supra were referring to air rights which
had already been conveyed away by the subjacent land owner, unlike the Macht case
where the subjacent land owner retained fee interest in the air space. Therefore, the
references made therein to air rights as independent units of real property were drived
from authority which is not analogous to the facts of the Macht case.
30. The concept of air rights as incidental to the ownership of land originated in the
common law maxim cujus est solum, ejus est usque and coelum et ad inferos, "to whom-
soever the soil belongs he owns also to the sky and to the depths," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
453 (4th ed. 1957); the maxim was, until the appearance of aviation, considered applicable
in accordance with the literal meaning of its words. 1 COKE, INSTrrTUE OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND § 1 at 4.a. (1st Am. ed. 1853); 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *18. See also
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *394-95 (distinguishing between "qualified" and "unquali-
fied" property rights). See generally Bell, Air Rights, 23 ILL. L. REV. 250 (1928); Note,
Airspace: A New Dimension in Property Law, 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 303, 306-07; Comment,
The Interest of the Occupier of Land in Superjacent Space-The New York View, 4
N.Y.L.F. 350, 352-53 (1958). In 1926, however, Congress enacted the Air Commerce Act
of 1926 [ch. 344, § 10, 44 Stat. 574] which declared the navigable air space above the
United States to be within the public domain. For the present provisions see Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938, § 104, 72 Stat. 740 (1958), codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1304 (1970).
Despite Justice Douglas' statement in the landmark case of United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946), that the maxim "has no place in the modem world," the Supreme
Court held in Causby that a landowner was entitled to just compensation for government
flights over his property leased for the flow of light and air. It can therefore be said that
from the standpoint of the development of real property law air rights are not units of real
property independent from the ownership of the subjacent tract unless they are expressly
conveyed to a separate fee holder.
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property and can be taxed as such.
The recognized tax treatment of the entity created by the
lease of March 24, 1961 will be discussed below, but it is first
necessary to identify that entity. The lease of March 24, 1961,
constituted the grant by Macht of a negative easement 3' to the
Charles Street Development Corporation, to be appurtenant to
the Blaustein Building.32 A negative easement does not entitle its
owner to enter upon the servient tenement but it does entitle him
to compel the possessor of the servient tenement to refrain from
doing things upon the servient tenement that he would otherwise
be entitled to do.33
A typical case of a negative easement is an easement of light
and air. Such an easement entitles the owner of it to compel
the possessor of the servient tenement to refrain from build-
ing upon that tenement in such a way as to interfere beyond
a certain extent or in certain ways with the access of light to
the land possessed by the person entitled to the benefit of the
easement. The interest protected by a negative easement is
always an interest in the enjoyment of the land possessed by
the one entitled to the benefits of the easement. Hence, a
negative easement is always an appurtenant easement.34
In the instant case, the dominant tenement is the Blaustein
Building to which the easement is appurtenant, 3 and the benefit
to the dominant tenement is the right to the unobstructed flow
of air and light across 11-13 East Fayette Street. The easement
in such a case is said to be appurtenant to the dominant tene-
ment, and the relationship between the two is often described "as
though the easement belonged in some way to the tenement.""
The servient tenement is the land at 11-13 East Fayette Street, 37
and its burden is the inability of its owner to build above a speci-
fied height or otherwise use or obstruct the air space.38
The lease itself does not speak in terms of easements, but,
as mentioned previously, describes the transaction as the lease of
air rights, specifying:
31. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.12 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
32. Id. § 8.13. See note 37 infra and accompanying text.
33. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 452 (1944).
34. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.12 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
35. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 456 (1944).
36. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.13 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952).
37. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 36, at § 8.14.
38. Cf. Janes v. Jenkins, 34 Md. 1 (1871) (servient landowner unable to build a
structure blocking dominant landowner's access to light and air due to grant of easement
to dominant landowner by servient landowner's predecessor in title).
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That during the continuance of this lease, the hereby leased
premises will not be used for any purpose other than for the
purpose of light and air as hereinabove recited, and no struc-
ture of any kind shall be constructed or maintained by Les-
see, in, on or through the leased premises during the continu-
ance of this lease.3 9
However, the fact that the instrument employs the language of a
lease does not prevent it from constituting the grant of an ease-
ment, but simply limits the duration of the easement to the term
of the lease.40 The Maryland Code states that "[n]o words of
inheritance shall be necessary to create an easement by grant or
by reservation, but every conveyance or reservation of an ease-
ment shall be construed to pass or reserve an easement in perpe-
tuity, unless a contrary intention shall appear by express
terms."4 Thus, in Maryland, the lease agreement between Macht
and Blaustein may create an easement by grant, and the term of
the lease simply serves as an express intention that the easement
be limited in time. The Court of Appeals of Maryland has held,
in Thurston v. Minke,4" that the effect of a condition limiting the
height of a building, contained in a lease, was "to create a right
or interest in the nature of an incorporeal herediment or easement
appurtenant to the contiguous hotel property, and arising out of
the parcel of land demised by the lease."43 In addition, the Wis-
consin case of Rice v. Reich" held that an agreement between
adjoining landowners for use of a driveway across a parcel of land
was an easement even though the grant denominated the transac-
tion as a lease.
VALUATION OF THE EASEMENT
The literature of valuation theory has little to say about ease-
ments. Generally, we are told that when, in the process of an
appraisal, an easement is discovered, it must be taken into ac-
count in the overall valuation picture.4" Though this is in accord
39. Lease and Agreement between Morton Macht, Lessor, and Charles Street Devel-
opment Corporation, Lessee, dated March 24, 1961, reproduced in Joint Record Extract
at E. 59, Macht v. Department of Assessments, 266 Md. 602, 296 A.2d 162 (1972).
40. "Easements may have qualities of duration corresponding to the qualities of
duration of possessory interests. Thus, there may be an easement for years, for life, or in
fee." 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.22 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
41. MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 8 (1973).
42. 32 Md. 487 (1870).
43. Id. at 494.
44. 51 Wis.2d 205, 186 N.W.2d 269 (1971).
45. Out of five texts on valuation theory, one contained no reference to easements.
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with the general rule of valuation theory, that every fact which
might possibly affect the value of a property must be taken into
account in its appraisal," it is not a sufficiently precise statement
to instruct an appraiser on how to treat an easement in his ap-
praisal. It also fails to make any distinction between an easement
in gross" and an easement appurtenant." Yet this distinction
may be crucial to the valuation of the property in question. In the
case of an easement in gross, there is a servient tenement which
bears the burden of the easement49 and may as a consequence be
lessened in value, but there is no dominant tenement. 0 Instead
there is a person who holds the incorporeal interest separately
from any estate in land.5' The Gas Company's Cases,5" the leading
Maryland cases on the taxation of easements, deal with the taxa-
tion of easements in gross to the holder of the incorporeal interest.
These cases held that the true test of the taxable value of the
easement is its producing value to its owner. 3 In United Railways
See G.L. SCHMUTz, THE APPRAISAL PROCESS (1959). Three others-A.A. RING, THE VALUA-
TION OF REAL ESTATE (1963); AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, SPECIAL
TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE EDUCATION COMMITTEE, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE
(1967); and A.A. MAY, THE VALUATION OF RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE (1953)-contained
references to easements similar to that contained in A.A. RING, THE VALUATION OF REAL
ESTATE, at 94 (1963): "Where violations of easements (rights for public ingress or egress
to or over the site) are apparent, it is the appraiser's responsibility to report them and to
estimate their effects upon the value and marketability of the property."
The ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISING (1968), a collection of essays, contains
two articles on easements, Appraisal of Rights of Way and Easements, and Appraisal of
Flowage Easements, both of which are too narrow in focus to provide an appraiser with
any general principles for valuation of land subject to easements.
46. "The final value estimate [arrived at by an assessor] must be a logical and
inevitable consequence in relationship to all phases of the situation and all factors that
create and condition value. The entire valuation must 'hang together'-its various items
must add up to the proper answer. There must be no unexplained discrepancies. In short,
the procedure followed and the estimate of value must both be convincing." T.L. BALL,
THE THREE APPROACHES at 11. This is an internal training publication of the Department
of Assessments and Taxation of Maryland.
47. An easement in gross is an easement which benefits an individual rather than a
dominant tenement. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.9 n. 1 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
48. An easement appurtenant is an easement which does benefit a dominant tene-
ment, and, therefore is appurtenant to it. See notes 31-39 supra and accompanying text.
49. This is true of an easement in gross, just as it is of an easement appurtenant.
Both have servient tenements which bear the burden of the easement. See notes 37-38
supra and accompanying text.
50. An easement in gross is one the benefit of which is not an incident of the
possession of land by the one entitled to the benefit of the uses authorized by the ease-
ment. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.9 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
51. "If an easement is an easement in gross, it belongs to the owner of it indepen-
dently of his possession of any land. ... Id. at 236.
52. Consolidated Gas Co. v. Baltimore City, 105 Md. 43, 65 A. 628 (1907); Consoli-
dated Gas Co. v. Baltimore City, 101 Md. 541, 61 A. 532 (1905).
53. 105 Md. at 57, 65 A. at 633; 101 Md. at 558, 61 A. at 538.
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& Electric Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore,4 the Court of Appeals
elaborated on the holding of The Gas Company's Cases:
. . . we think the assessable value of a railroad easement for
the purpose of taxation can only be determined by looking
to all the elements that in any way reflect the worth or utility
of the easement; the original cost of the franchise, if any, the
cost of operating the road, the gross earnings, the amount of
car services required, the amount of capital stock invested,
and as well as the amount of taxes already paid up on its
tangible property."
It must not, however, be assumed that the ascertainable value of
the easement in the hands of its owner is the same value factor
which should be reduced from the value of the servient estate. For
example, a rural easement in gross for passage across farmland
may be worth a great deal of money in the hands of a railroad,
yet only slightly diminish the value of the servient estate in the
hands of the farmer. In fact, if the farmer reserved a rental when
granting the easement, its income producing value may enhance
the value of the servient estate. Similarly, an industrial park
which grants an easement in gross for passage to a railroad, or for
gas and electric lines to a utility may find its land greatly enh-
anced in value as a result of the easement.
The principles established in Maryland by The Gas Com-
pany's Cases" for the assessment of easements in gross are not
particularly helpful in solving the assessment problems presented
by the appurtenant easement in the instant case. This is because
The Gas Company's Cases focused on the value of the easement
in the hands of the grantee. 7 They did not consider the value
consequences to the servient land because the servient land was
city-owned and therefore exempt from taxation, and, of course,
no dominant estate could be considered because none exists in
the case of an easement in gross.5"
There is no other authority in Maryland which establishes
legal principles for the assessment of land subject to an appurten-
ant easement, and the court's opinion in Macht does little to clear
up the problem. The Macht opinion represents a strained at-
54. 111 Md. 264, 73 A. 633 (1909).
55. 111 Md. at 272, 73 A. at 636.
56. Consolidated Gas Co. v. Baltimore City, 105 Md. 43, 65 A. 628 (1907); Consoli-
dated Gas Co. v. Baltimore City, 101 Md. 541, 61 A. 532 (1905).
57. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
58. See notes 50-51 supra and accompanying text.
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tempt to uphold the Maryland Tax Court's decision that air
rights may be assessed and taxed separately from the fee interest
to which they are incidental, rather than a statement of legal
principles for the assessment and taxation of land subject to an
easement appurtenant.59 It is, therefore, necessary to turn to other
jurisdictions for a statement of such general principles.
One of the most comprehensive discussions of the problem
was rendered by the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia in District of Columbia v. Capital Mortgage & Title
Co., Inc."0 The Capital Mortgage case dealt with the problem of
whether an appurtenant easement is extinguished by the tax sale
of the servient estate. In support of its holding that a tax sale of
the servient land does not extinguish an easement carved out out
of the servient land and appurtenant to the dominant land, the
court quoted the following passage from the Restatement of Prop-
erty:
In the case of such an easement the dominant tenement
has its value for sale purposes increased by the existence of
the easement. Upon a sale of the land constituting this tene-
ment, whether the sale is for tax purposes or not, the pur-
chaser gets the benefit of the easement. Accordingly the
value of the land for sale purposes and hence for tax purposes
is increased because of the existence of the easement. If a tax
levied on the basis of this increased value is paid, the one
paying the tax has, in effect, paid a tax on the interest in the
servient tenement created by the easement. If this interest
has been taxed against the owner of the dominant tenement
the value represented by it ought not to be again taxed
against the owner of the servient tenement. Hence a sum
59. It has been held in Maryland that it is not the function of the courts to formulate
instructions for the assessment of specific property. See State Tax Comm'n v. Brandt
Cabinet Works, Inc., 202 Md. 533, 97 A.2d 290 (1953); C&P Telephone Co. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 158 Md. 512, 148 A. 832 (1930). However, in cases which have brought to light
the need for general principles of law to serve as guidelines in the assessment process, the
Court of Appeals has not hesitated to formulate such general principles. For example, in
response to the confusion which arose over the legal principles underlying the proper
assessment of an easement in gross in the hands of the grantee, the court in the Gas
Company's Cases [105 Md. 43, 65 A. 628 (1907); 101 Md. 541, 61 A. 532 (1905)] responded
with a statement of general principles. The Macht case was just such a case where the
formulation of general principles by the court was in order. Macht involves the problem
of valuing both dominant and servient land subject to an easement appurtenant. There
are no cases in point in the State of Maryland. There is, in fact, nothing in the statutory
or case law of Maryland to guide an assessor who is confronted by land subject to an
easement appurtenant.
60. 84 F. Supp. 788 (D.D.C. 1949).
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representing the decrease in value of the servient tenement
produced by the existence of the easement ought to be sub-
tracted from what would have been the value of that tene-
ment if unincumbered when it is assessed for tax purposes.
If it is to be subtracted the title of the purchaser on the tax
sale should be subject to the easement.61
Thus, the question of whether an appurtenant easement is
extinguished by a tax sale of the servient land is directly tied to
the way in which an easement is taken into account in assessing
the two properties. Therefore, it is through extinguishment cases
like Capital Mortgage that much can be learned about principles
of assessment.
Capital Mortgage was cited with approval by the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Engel v.
Catucci,12 another case dealing with the survival of appurtenant
easements after tax sale of the servient estate. In Engel the court
of appeals further explained the reasoning of the district court in
Capital Mortgage:
The reasoning of the authorities holding that the ease-
ment survives the tax deed is, briefly, that when an ease-
ment is appurtenant to a dominant estate it attaches to that
estate, being carved out of the servient estate; that the value
of the dominant estate is increased by the existence of the
easement and in effect thus includes the value of the ease-
ment; that, when a tax is paid upon the value of the domi-
nant estate determined in this manner, a tax has in effect
been paid upon the easement; that the tax upon the servient
estate is upon a value lessened because of the existence of the
easement; that a sale for nonpayment of that tax ought to
be a sale of the lessened estate . . . 3
Thus, the general rule of assessment of land subject to an appur-
tenant easement may be simply stated that "[w]hen an ease-
ment is carved out of one property for the benefit of another the
market value of the servient estate is lessened, and that of the
dominant estate increased; practically by just the value of the
easement; and the respective tenements should therefore be as-
sessed accordingly."64
61. Id. at 789-90, quoting RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 509 (1944).
62. 197 F.2d 597 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
63. Id. at 599.
64. Tax Lien Co. v. Shultz, 213 N.Y. 9, 106 N.E. 751 (1914) (easement of light, air
and access). Accord, Ehren Realty Co. v. Magna Charts Bldg. & Loan Assn., 120 N.J.
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The applicability of this rule in the state of Maryland may
be questioned in light of Hill v. Williams,'5 a Maryland case
which held that a tax sale of the servient land extinguishes an
appurtenant easement. There are, however, three reasons why the
Hill case does not preclude the application of the general rule in
Maryland in spite of its language to the effect that "[lt is not
compatible with public convenience and the prompt collection of
revenue for the state to trace out all the sub-divided or qualified
interests that may be held in real estate and seek to hold the
various owners responsible.""6 First, as pointed out by the Court
of Appeals in Macht, the rule of Hill that a tax sale of the ser-
vient land extinguishes an appurtenant easement was overturned
by subsequent changes in Maryland law. 7 Therefore, today, the
tax collector must in fact ". . . trace out all the sub-divided or
qualified interests that may be held in real estate. . . ."" Sec-
ond, the Hill case was dealing with the tax collection stage of the
taxing process, rather than the assessment stage as in Macht, and
it is much more persuasive for a court to allow the tax collector
to refuse recognition of an easement which was overlooked by the
assessor than to allow the assessor to ignore such a value factor
when it is readily apparent to him. The Hill case itself made a
distinction between the duties of the taxing authority at the
collection stage as opposed to the assessment stage when it
stated:
. ..there is nothing in our general tax system which com-
pels the collector to examine what title a party has to land
with which he assessed. The assessments are made by other
officers, and he is not required to review or to verify their
proceedings before making a sale. 9
Third, the easement in the Hill case was unrecorded, and in
no way readily apparent to the local taxing authority. The court,
therefore, said that "[ilts [the State's] policy is to assess the
fee simple value of the land to the holder of the possession, where
Eq. 136, 184 A. 203 (1936); People ex. rel. Poor v. Wells, 139 App. Div. 83, 124 N.Y.S. 36
(1910); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 509 (1944); 3 COOLEY, TAXATION §§ 1154, 1494 (4th
ed. 1924). Cf. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 112 (Supp. 1971).
65. 104 Md. 595, 65 A. 413 (1906).
66. Id. at 603, 65 A. at 414.
67. MD. ANN. CODE art 81, § 112 (Supp. 1971) provides in part that "the decree shall
vest .. . an absolute title . .. free . . . of all ... encumbrances .. .except ...
easements to which the property is subject ..
68. Hill v. Williams, 104 Md. 595, 65 A. 413 (1906).
69. Id. at 603, 65 A. at 414 (emphasis added).
19731
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
its real owner is not apparent or accessible, leaving the parties
interested to adjust the proportions of liability between them-
selves."7 ° Despite the fact that this language made more sense in
its original context of Mayor & City Council of Balto. v. Caton
Co.,71 a case dealing with the taxation of land subject to ninety-
nine year leases renewable forever, the Hill court cited it in an
attempt to explain that where an easement is not recorded or
otherwise apparent to the assessor, he need not include it in his
assessment. The converse of this proposition would, of course, be
that when an easement is recorded or otherwise apparent, as in
the Macht case, the assessor must include it in his assessment.
This positive conclusion, as derived from the negative statement
of Hill, is, in fact, supported by the general rule of assessment
theory mentioned previously, that is, that every fact tending to
affect the value of a piece of real estate must be taken into ac-
count in its assessment.72
The only other possible argument for denying the applicabil-
ity in Maryland of the general rule that the servient estate be
decreased in value and the dominant estate increased by a factor
equivalent to the value of the easement is the argument made by
the appellant in Engel v. Catucci,7 3 that in a jurisdiction like the
District of Columbia (and Maryland) the real estate tax is a tax
directly in rem-not upon interests in land but upon the land
itself.74 The Court of Appeals in Engel effectively ruled out this
argument with the following reasoning:
While the real estate tax is, as a matter of legal concept
upon the realty itself and not upon property interests in the
realty, as a practical matter when Catucci paid taxes upon
his lots they must have been upon the value determined in
part by the fact that there was access over Lot 806 from
Third Street. . . . The statute requires that realty be as-
sessed "at not less than the full and true value thereof in
lawful money." [D.C. Code § 47-713 (1940)]. The full and
true value of the row lots [the dominant land] was undoubt-
70. Id. at 604, 65 A. at 414 (emphasis added).
71. 63 Md. 218 (1885).
72. See note 46 supra.
73. 197 F.2d 597 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
74. See Lewis, The Tax Articles of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 13 MD. L.
REV. 83, 101 (1953). Therein it was explained that the 1915 amendment to Article 15 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights ". . . shifted the emphasis from persons to property.
Formerly uniformity related to the worth of the taxpayer, the requirement being that each
person be taxed in accordance with his worth in property. Now the requirment of uniform-
ity applies to the tax on the property itself."
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edly increased and the full and true value of Lot 806 [the
servient land] decreased by the existence of the easement.
The record indicates that this was true as to Lot 806, since
it shows that the lot was bid in by the District at about two
cents a square foot, a nominal price. While the taxes paid on
the row lots were . . . on those lots alone, the easement was
an appurtenance to those lots, and we must assume the as-
sessment of those lots included the value of the easement,
that being part of the full and true value of the lots.75
This reasoning is equally applicable in Maryland where the tax
laws require an assessment standard similar to the District of
Columbia's requirement that realty be assessed "at not less than
the full and true value thereof in lawful money."7" In other words,
Maryland law requires that "[a]ll real property directed in this
article to be assessed, shall be assessed at the full cash value
thereof on the date of finality."77 It is therefore suggested that an
analogy can be drawn between the language of the District of
Columbia's statute and that of the Maryland statute, to the effect
that the "full cash value" of dominant land in Maryland ought
to include an easement appurtenant thereto, and the "full cash
value" of servient land in Maryland ought to be decreased by a
factor equivalent to the value of the easement.
Thus the lease affects the assessments of both properties.
The assessment of the servient tenement must be decreased be-
cause of the burden which it bears. The dominant tenement's
assessment must be increased. This is not taxation of the lessee
upon his leasehold interest; admittedly, the lessee is not taxed
when a lease is created. Instead, taxation results because an ease-
ment appurtenant to that tenement is a factor which affects its
value, and therefore must be reflected in its assessment.
THE EFFECT OF THE RENTAL
The principles of assessment theory derived from the District
of Columbia cases represent the view of the great majority of
jurisdictions which have considered such cases,7 but it does not
fully answer the problem presented by the Macht case. In Macht,
there is the additional set of value factors presented by the "re-
75. 197 F.2d at 600.
76. D.C. CODE § 47-713 (1968).
77. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 14(b)(1) (Supp. 1972).
78. See Engel v. Catucci, 197 F.2d 597, 597-99 & nn. 8-9, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
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cital" paid by Blaustein and received by Macht.5 The necessity
of including the value factors created by the rent in an assessment
of the two properties does not preclude the applicability of the
general rule derived above but simply requires that after it is
applied, the resulting value of the two properties then be adjusted
for the rent reserved.
According to a strict application of the general rule, the land
at 11-13 East Fayette Street, the servient tenement, 0 would have
its assessment lowered in proportion to the reduction in value of
the land resulting from an inability to build above a specified
height for 98 years and 9 months.8 ' The Blaustein Building, the
dominant tenement,"2 would have its assessment increased in pro-
portion to the enhancement of its value resulting from the free
flow of light and air across the servient tenement. It is, however,
necessary to introduce two practical considerations into the ap-
plication of the general rule. First, the reduction in value of the
servient tenement, the land at 11-13 East Fayette, should be
small since, at this time, the building restriction implicit in the
lease is not interfering with the Macht's present use and enjoy-
ment of the land as it would with a third party purchaser who
wanted to build a taller structure. In fact, it has been suggested
that since the Machts themselves knowingly subjected them-
selves to this restriction, they ought not benefit from it through
a substantial reduction in their assessment.84
Second, an increase in the assessment of the dominant tene-
ment, the Blaustein Building, as required by the general rule is
dependent, in this case, upon the method of assessment used to
value the building. It is, therefore, necessary to explain certain
elementary valuation theory prior to discussing the valuation of
the dominant estate.
As explained previously, in order to place a value on a piece
79. Macht's property, the servient estate, may be reduced in value because of the
burden of the easement, but, on the other hand, the rental received from Blaustein creates
an offsetting value factor. The opposite is true of the Blaustein Building, the dominant
estate.
80. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
81. The task of formulating a method to compute diminution in value of the servient
estate resulting from the existence of the easement is beyond the scope of this note.
82. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
83. For a detailed discussion of the valuation of the dominant estate, the Blaustein
Building, see text accompanying notes 106-11 infra.
84. Interview with Norris 0. Burgee, Acting Director of the Department of Assess-
ments of Baltimore City, August 10, 1972. This suggestion is in accord with the estoppel
argument made by the Court of Appeals at the close of its opinion in Macht v. Department
of Assessments, 266 Md. 602, 296 A.2d 162 (1972).
[VOL. XXXIII
MACHT V. DEPARTMENT OF ASSESSMENTS
of improved real property, all factors relevant to value must be
taken into account.85 For instance, a lot which is improved, but
not to its highest and best use, may be less valuable than a nearby
lot which is vacant, because of the cost of demolition of the out-
dated improvements." There are three different methods of ap-
praisal, which are employed in a complementary fashion to pro-
duce a total valuation picture."7 The first is the "sales-price
theory" which holds that a property is worth what it sells for.
Exponents of this theory believe that they can ascertain the value
of a property by finding out what prices have been paid recently
for similar properties in the same neighborhood.88 The "cost
theory" advocates that a property is worth its cost of production
minus depreciation. It is based on the appraiser's axiom that no
property is worth more than its cost of reproduction. 9 The final
method is the "income theory" which says that income is the
index to the worth of the real estate. Adherents to this theory
contend that value is the present worth of future income. 0
None of the three approaches is applicable in every situation,
and each has its distinct liabilities. 1 The recent trend, however,
is to "weigh the three approaches one against the others and
finally select one as primary in importance."9 The appraiser
should select a "zone of reasonableness," 9 bounded on one end
by the minimum value of the property and on the other by its
maximum value. Somewhere in between lies the real value of the
property. In order to approximate this real value, the appraiser
must select the most applicable of the three approaches, and at
85. See note 46 supra.
86. Real estate is valued by determining its highest and best use, and the adjust-
ments are made for deviations therefrom. Interview with Thomas L. Ball, Valuation
Advisor for the Department of Assessments and Taxation of the State of Maryland,
August 14, 1972.
87. See, e.g., Fields v. Supervisor of Assessments, 255 Md. 1, 255 A.2d 417 (1969).
88. T.L. BALL, THE THREE APPROACHED at 2.
89. Id. at 4.
90. Id. at 6.
91. The "sales-price theory" is limited by the fact that it makes no provision for
cases where there are no sales of comparable properties to consider. Id. at 4. The "cost
theory" fails to account for intangibles, and is inapplicable when applied to "over" or
"under" improved properties. Id. at 5. The "income theory" is based on capitalization
of net income, and the rate of capitalization, which is chosen at the discretion of the
appraiser, can greatly vary the result. Id. at 7. With respect to income-producing easement
for light and air, only the "income theory" is applicable.
92. The relevant weight to be given to any particular factor or appraisal method
is within the assessor's reasonable, expert judgment. See Bornstein v. State Tax Comm'n,
227 Md. 331, 337, 176 A.2d 859 (1962).
93. T.L. BALL, THE THREE APPROACHES at 9.
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the same time check his conclusions by comparison to the other
approaches."
He does not make three estimates of value and average them
by dividing their sum by three. But he does often make three
preliminary value estimates and relates each one of them to
the spread between the minimum and maximum figures that
bracket his zone of reasonableness. In this way he seeks to
narrow the zone of reasonableness and to arrive at a judg-
ment of value which appeals to his own reason as being
sound and proper and which he can support with convincing
evidence.95
Whenever a new building is erected the State Department of
Assessments and Taxation requires the local assessors to base the
first assessment upon the reproduction value of the building."
Therefore, when the Blaustein Building was first assessed, the
assessment should have been increased by a factor equivalent to
the value of the easement appurtenant to it as required by the
general rule. However, the next assessment of the Blaustein
Building would be based upon capitalization of rental income,97
and until recently, the Department of Assessments of Baltimore
City was using an income figure based upon gross receipts.
Therefore, an increase in the value of the Blaustein Building
would not have been necessary since the factor by which the
easement enhanced the value of the building is built into such an
assessment. In other words, the rental rates per square foot on the
east side of the Blaustein Building are as high as they are because
of the free flow of light and air produced by the easement. There-
fore, any further increase in an assessment based on such gross
receipts would be unfounded. Baltimore City is, however, now
94. See, e.g., Weil v. Supervisor of Assessments, 266 Md. 238, 292 A.2d 68 (1972);
Fields v. Supervisor of Assessments, 255 Md. 1, 255 A.2d 417 (1969); Supervisor of Assess-
ments v. Banks, 252 Md. 600, 609, 250 A.2d 860 (1969); Easter v. Department of Assess-
ments, 228 Md. 547, 550, 180 A.2d 700 (1962); Bornstein v. State Tax Comm'n, 227 Md.
331, 176 A.2d 859 (1962); State Tax Comm'n v. Brandt Cabinet Works, 202 Md. 533, 543,
97 A.2d 290 (1953); State Tax Comm'n v. C & P Tel. Co., 193 Md. 222, 235, 66 A.2d 477
(1949).
95. T.L. BALL, THE THREE APPROACHES at 10.
96. Interview with E. Stephen Derby, Assistant Attorney General, State of Mary-
land, April 12, 1973. The reason for this requirment is that the reproduction value of a
new building is its only ascertainable value since it has not yet developed a rental income
history, and since there is usually no market data on sales of very new buildings.
97. Interview with Norris 0. Burgee, Acting Director, Department ofAssessments
and Taxation of Baltimore City, April 11, 1973. The best measure of the value of invest-
ment property is the return on the investment, determined by rental income.
98. Id.
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switching to a net receipts test for capitalization of income assess-
ments, by informal State directive." This means that instead of
capitalizing gross receipts, the assessor will first subtract an al-
lowance for vacancy as well as expenses. 10 Assuming that the rent
paid by Blaustein is an allowable expense in computing net re-
ceipts,'0 ' the new method will bring the assessor to a result that
no longer inherently reflects the value of the easement in the
assessment of the dominant estate. Therefore, the general rule
would require that an assessment arrived at in such a manner be
further increased by a factor equal to the value of the appurten-
ant estate.
The effect of the rental paid for the easement on the value
of the respective properties may now be considered. Macht, the
holder of the servient estate, is receiving a substantial rental in
compensation for bearing the burden of the easement. 112 If the
assessor's theory of taking all facts affecting value into considera-
tion is followed, 0 3 then value of this rental payment must be
included in any assessment of the realty at 11-13 East Fayette
Street. Since the "income theory"'0 4 of valuation is the only one
of the three approaches applicable for determining the value of
the easement as an entity for the income-producing servient es-
tate, the present value of the future rental income must be the
measure of the easement's value.
Hence there are two value factors applicable to an assess-
ment of the servient estate-a reduction in value for bearing the
burden of the easement, albeit a minimal reduction,'"1 and the
present value of future rental payments. These two values may
neutralize each other, or one may exceed the other. In any case,
a meaningful assessment of the servient estate can be produced
only through the application of both factors.
The effect of the rental payments upon the value of the domi-
nant estate will, as previously explained, depend upon the
method of valuation employed.'' Blaustein, the holder of the
dominant estate, is paying a substantial sum of money for the
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. The question of whether the rent paid by Blaustein for the negative appurten-
ant easement will be deductible from its income, as an allowable expense, in computing
net rentals is a question to be decided when the Blaustein Building is re-assessed. Id.
102. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
103. See note 46 supra.
104. See text accompanying note 90 supra.
105. See text accompanying note 84 supra.
106. See text accompanying notes 96-101 supra.
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enjoyment of the easement. 7 Again, if all facts affecting the
value of the property are taken into account,' then a value factor
equal to the rental paid by Blaustein must be subtracted from the
assessment of the dominant estate. Therefore, if a capitalization
of income method is used to assess the Blaustein Building, the net
receipts test is used to arrive at the base income, and the annual
cost of the easement is an allowable deduction from gross re-
ceipts; then, of course, the effect of the annual cost of the ease-
ment on the value of the building will be inherent in the assess-
ment. In that case, the general rule would merely require that the
assessment so derived be increased by a factor equivalent to the
value of the easement to the dominant estate.
If, however, the capitalization of income method based on
gross receipts, or either of the other two approaches is used to
assess the dominant estate, then there would be two extra value
factors applicable to such assessment of the dominant estate;
these are an increase in value by a factor equivalent to the value
of the easement to the dominant estate and a reduction in value
for the present value of future rental payments.
There is, however, authority for ignoring the rental payments
entirely in making the two related assessments. In Crocker-
McElwain Co. v. Board of Assessors,'° a Massachusetts court
held that the right of a water power company which had sold mill
rights by conveyances granting appurtenant water power rights
subject to a perpetual annual rental was not to be considered as
an element of value in assessing the land of the company for
property taxation."0 The Crocker case also held that the obliga-
tions of the owners of the mill sites to pay such rents for their
appurtenant water power rights should not be considered in de-
termining the extent of enhancement of the values of the mill
sites by reason of such water power rights."'
THE COURT OF APPEAL'S DECISION
Instead of seeking to formulate general principles of assess-
ment applicable to the facts of Macht, the court sought only to
affirm the separate assessment of "Air Rights Only." The court's
approach was to show why the Macht's objections to the separate
107. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
108. See note 46 supra.
109. 296 Mass. 338, 5 N.E.2d 558 (1937); cf. Essex Co. v. City of Lawrence, 214 Mass.
79, 100 N.E. 1016 (1913).
110. 296 Mass. 338, 5 N.E.2d 558 (1937).
111. Id.
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assessment were invalid, rather than to affirmatively explain the
basis for the separate assessment. The Machts presented three
arguments against the assessment, and the court's opinion was
therefore organized into three principal sections refuting each
argument.
The Machts first argued that "[t]he Department of Assess-
ments of Baltimore City has no authority to value and assess 'Air
Rights Only' as a class or subclass of real property separate and
distinct from all other interests in the land under such 'Air Rights
Only.' " This argument is identical to the ground upon which
the Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals reversed the original
assessment," 3 that is, that the Maryland Constitution provides
that only the General Assembly shall classify taxable entities in
real property,"' and they have not, in the tax laws of Maryland,
evidenced any desire to so classify air rights as a separately separ-
ately taxable entity."' The Machts supported this argument
with two assertions. First, since the Maryland legislature has
provided for the separate assessment and taxation of certain lim-
ited interests in real estate, such as, for example, mineral
rights,"6 those interests which were not mentioned, such as air
rights, were specifically excluded from separate assessment and
taxation."7 Second, the Machts attempted to draw a parallel be-
tween the administrative creation of a new classification of a
separately taxable interest in real property, as they allege oc-
curred in the instant case, and the impermissible sub-
classification which occurs when two identical pieces of real prop-
erty are taxed at different rates based on the character of their
112. 266 Md. at 607, 296 A.2d at 165.
113. Trustees v. Department of Assessments, Appeal No. 1013-68/69 (Bd. of Munici-
pal and Zoning Appeals of Baltimore City, April 16, 1969), reproduced in Joint Record
Extract at E. 6, Macht v. Department of Assessments, 266 Md. 602, 296 A.2d 162 (1972).
114. ". . . [t]hat the General Assembly shall, by uniform rules, provide for the
separate assessment, classification and sub-classification of land, improvements on land
and personal property, as it may deem proper. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RiGHTS, art.
15.
115. See MD. ANN. CODE, art. 81, §§ 14, 19 (Supp. 1972).
116. See MD. ANN. CODE, art. 81, § 19(a)(3) (Supp. 1972), which provides in perti-
nent part: ". . . [fn ... case of the separate ownership of the surface of land and of
minerals or mineral rights therein, the assessing authority may, in its discretion, make
separate rate assessments of the value of the surface and of such minerals or mineral
rights."
117. See 266 Md. at 608, 296 A.2d at 166.
118. See State Tax Comm'n v. Gales, 222 Md. 543, 161 A.2d 676 (1960), which held
unconstitutional an attempt by the legislature to have agricultural land assessed and
taxed more favorably than similarly situated nonagricultural land. See MD. ANN. CODE
art. 81, § 19(b) (Supp. 1972). See also Supervisor v. Alsop, 232 Md. 188, 192 A.2d 484
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use. "8 The analogy was confusingly presented, and seems to have
had a less than positive effect in clarifying the entire first argu-
ment to the court. In fact, the court entirely dismissed the anal-
ogy in a cursory statement." 9
Then, in response to the Machts' argument that the Depart-
ment of Assessments created a new classification of taxable prop-
erty, which only the legislature can do, the court said, "we are
simply not persuaded that an assessment based on the separate
valuation of a property owner's several rights is a classification
at all."'' 0 The court explained that it did not find ". . . any
validity in the argument that the Code provision authorizing the
separate assessment of mineral rights effectively precludes the
separate assessment of other rights which together may comprise
fee simple ownership. The provision for the separate assessment
of mineral rights is directed at the situation where the surface is
in one ownership and the mineral rights in another.''
l
Judge Barnes, however, did not agree. In his dissenting opin-
ion, he argued:
It is apparent that the General Assembly has not au-
thorized any assessing authority to make a separate valua-
tion and assessment of "Air Rights" and, by enumerating the
instances in which separate assessments of less than all of
the rights in land may be made [i.e. air rights], has by
implication excluded others. Inclusio unius est, exclusion
alterius. See American Security & Trust Co. v. New Amster-
dam Casualty Co., 246 Md. 36, 40-41, 227 A.2d 214, 216-17
(1967).122
The court's opinion on the first major argument presented by
Macht was an easy target for the dissent. The majority failed to
provide any authority for its claim that the Code provision for
separate assessment of mineral rights is directed at cases of sepa-
rate ownership of the surface and the minerals. 2 1 In addition, the
cases which the court cited in support of its contention that a
(1963) (upholding a similar statute, but after the 1960 amendments to MD. CONST., DECL.
OF RIGHTS, arts. 15 and 43).
119. "It seems to us that this argument confuses the concepts of the separate classi-
fication of real and personal property and of the sub-classification of personal property
contemplated by Code Art. 81, § 14(a) with a consideration of the elements of fee simple
ownership which, in the aggregate, may be equated with the "full cash value" of real
property statutorily mandated for purposes of taxation by Art. 81, § 14(b)(1)." 266 Md.
at 608, 296 A.2d at 166.
120. Id. at 608, 296 A.2d at 166.
121. Id. at 608, 296 A.2d at 166.
122. Id. at 618-19, 296 A.2d at 171.
123. 266 Md. at 608, 296 A.2d at 166.
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separate assessment of air rights is not forbidden by Maryland
law were sufficiently different from the instant case to do little
damage to Macht's argument. The cases cited were Consolidated
Gas Co. v. Baltimore,' where the appellant's easement in gross
for use of the land of another, was assessed separately from the
land, and Susquehanna Power Co. v. Tax Commission,' 5 where
submerged lands were separately assessed to their owner, who
was not the owner of the water covering them. In both cases, the
separate assessment was based upon separate ownership of the
various elements of the fee, whereas in the instant case all of the
elements were owned by Macht.
Searching for an alternative justification for the legality of
the separate assessment of "Air Rights Only," the court sug-
gested:
The Tax Court advanced an additional argument which
is not without merit: that in separately valuing the airspace,
the City was acting to reach "escaped" property as permit-
ted by Code, Art. 81 §§ 34 and 36 which permit the value of
escaped property, upon discovery, to be added to an assess-
ment upon which levy has already been made.' 6
However, as Judge Barnes pointed out in his dissenting opinion,
sections 34 and 36 are inapplicable to the present situation be-
cause the air space over the Macht Building was property which
the Department of Assessments was fully aware of in the past, but
to which it had attributed a zero value in earlier assessments of
124. 105 Md. 43, 65 A. 628 (1907).
125. 159 Md. 334, 151 A. 29 (1931), aff'd 283 U.S. 291 (1931).
126. 266 Md. at 610, 296 A.2d at 167. The Maryland Tax Court said, "[tihe assess-
ment on October 24, 1968, by the Baltimore City Department of Assessments was in effect
an attempt to make an additional assessment to the real property assessment of 11-13 East
Fayette Street of a valuable unit of the said real property which had escaped taxation for
many years. The assessment of "Air Rights Only" referred to that independent unit of
real property that had escaped taxation since 1961. There is no evidence that the assess-
ment was not so construed. ... Department of Assessments v. Trustees, Case No. 637
(Md. Tax Court, December 16, 1971). In fact there was also no evidence, appearing on
the record, that the assessment was so construed. See Petition of Appeal to Maryland Tax
Court by the Department of Assessments of Baltimore Fayette Street. Furthermore, since
the lease of March 24, 1961, the air space has, as evidenced by this entire case, been under
active consideration by the Department of Assessment of Baltimore City. The only reason
why it was not taxed earlier was because of procedural problems, see Decision of Board of
Municipal and Zoning Appeals, May 26, 1965, Appeal No. 1356-65, Brief and Appendix
of Appellee, at Apx. 3, Macht v. Department of Assessments, 266 Md. 602, 296 A.2d 162
(1972). Yet the Maryland Tax Court asserts that this is escaped property, subject to the
provisions of MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 34 (1969). This holding is irreconcilable with the
Bay Ridge decision which asserts that property of which the local assessor is deemed to
be merely constructively aware is not escaped property.
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the Machts' property, which, of course, always included the air
space. '2 1
In concluding the first section of its opinion, the court said,
". we see no reason why land, improvements and air space
could not be separately valued for assessment purposes, so long
as the sum of the elements did not exceed the value of the
whole."'' 28 Once again, however, Judge Barnes did not agree. He
explained that land, improvements and air space should not be
separately valued for assessment because:
. . . the assessing authority must necessarily consider the
diminution in the value of the land from the restriction of the
use of the air rights for a very substantial period of time as
well as any addition to the value of the land from a capitali-
zation of net rental from the lease of those air rights. Logi-
cally, but not at all necessarily, . . . the diminution in
127. Judge Barnes stated:
The majority suggests (but does not hold) that there might be merit in the argu-
ment advanced by the Tax Court that the "Air Rights" could be valued and as-
sessed as "escaped property," pursuant to Art. 81, §§ 34 and 36. The escaped
property procedure only applies to property 'which was not assessed, but which
ought to have been assessed.' The uncontradicted evidence is that the Macht land
was assessed and this land included the air rights above the surface of the land.
The lease of the air rights was duly recorded and the Department not only had
constructive notice of the lease, but actual knowledge of its existence when the
assessment of the land in the present case was made. There was no "subsequent
discovery" of the air rights. See Mid Towne Plymouth, Inc. v. State Dept. of
Assessments & Taxation, 228 Md. 66, 178 A.2d 422 (1962). As already observed, the
appraisers could have considered the diminution of the value of the land resulting
from the lease of the air rights, as well as any increase in its value resulting from
the rent reserved in the lease, when the assessment of the value of the land was
made. It is not the fault of the Machts that this was not done. I cannot perceive
how any later separate assessment of "Air Rights Only" could possibly be an assess-
ment of "escaped property" under the provisions of Art. 81, §§ 34 and 36.
266 Md. at 620, 296 A.2d at 172.
128. The court cited the Note, Conveyancing and Taxtion of Air Rights, 64 COLUM.
L. REv. 338, 350-354 (1964), as supporting the assertion that land improvements and air
space may be separately valued for assessment purposes as long as the sum of the parts
does not exceed the value of the whole. See 266 Md. at 610, 296 A.2d at 167. Yet, as
explained at note 21 supra, the entire note is devoted to a discussion of the tax treatment
of a developer who obtains air rights for building purposes, and there is nothing contained
therein which relates to the tax treatment of the subjacent landowners. See 64 COLUM. L.
Rav. 338 (1964).
A further practical problem with the court's holding that the elements of fee owner-
ship may be valued separately so long as their aggregate value does not exceed the value
of the whole, is that if the court's ultimate concern is with a correct valuation of the whole
fee interest, then it would seem that a better rule would be to require that all fee interests
be valued together so that the effect of each upon one another may be seen at one time,
as a whole picture, rather than allowing for sporadic separate assessments of various
elements under the guise of concern for the proper value of the whole.
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value by the lease of the air rights should be roughly equiva-
lent to the value of the rent reserved in the lease. At least,
the Machts should have the opportunity to establish the
factor of such diminution in value. It is clear, however, that
they have had no such opportunity and the assessors, in fact,
gave no consideration to such a factor. 9
In other words, though the rental of the air space increases the
value of the property, the building restriction implicit in the lease
has the effect of simultaneously decreasing the value of the
Macht property. Therefore, if an assessment is made on the entire
property, including the air rights, then one factor will offset the
other, to the benefit of the taxpayer. If, however, the assessment
on the land and improvements remains unchanged, as it did in
this case, and the air rights are assessed separately, which the
majority condones, then the taxpayer is arguably denied an as-
sessment on the true value of his entire interest as reflected by
the balancing of one factor against the other.'
The Machts' second and third arguments to the Court of
Appeals challenged the constitutionality of the assessment. The
Machts asserted that whether the assessment was made, first, on
the air space only or, second, on the entire fee interest, including
the air space, it is unconstitutional to assess air space which is
leased to the owner of adjacent property for the free flow of light
and air at a higher value than air space which is utilized by its
owner for the free flow of light and air,' as is done for example
in the case of multi-stage buildings, or buildings which are set
back on their own land, which benefit from the free flow of light
and air across their own lower elements.'32 The Machts contend
that the only difference between the multi-stage cases and the
instant case is that in the instant case they are receiving rental
income for such air space, whereas in the multi-stage cases, the
subjacent tract, and thus the air space above it, is owned by the
129. 266 Md. at 620, 296 A.2d at 172.
130. This problem would of course be solved through application of the general
principles of assessment of land subject to appurtenant easements. See notes 60-64 supra
and accompanying text.
131. See Brief of Appellants at 16, 21, Macht v. Department of Assessments, 266
Md. 602, 296 A.2d 162 (1972).
132. The Machts took great pains to introduce twenty-three examples into the re-
cord of properties in Baltimore City which fit the multi-stage description. See Deposition
of Max L. Cohen, Senior Assessor, Department of Assessments of Baltimore City, re-
produced in Joint Record Extract, at E. 76-77, Macht v. Department of Assessments, 266
Md. 602, 296 A.2d 162 (1972).
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owner of the benefiting building. 3' The Machts are, therefore,
saying that since it is unconstitutional to tax like property differ-
ently, it is unconstitutional to assess them on their air space,
whether separately from or together with the remaining elements
of the fee, without so assessing all other similarly situated land.,3 4
The court divided its answer to this problem into two sec-
tions, the former in response to the case where the air space is
assessed separately from the other fee interest, and the latter in
response to the case where the value of the air space is included
in the assessment on the entire fee interest. Its answer to the
problem in the former situation was simply that in other cases
where air space is utilized by its owner for light and air, the air
space is subject to assessment and taxation in the sense that an
"income approach" assessment of such property reflects the value
of the air space to the extent of the property's enhancement in
rental income due to the free flow of light and air. 5
The answer to the constitutional problem in the latter situa-
tion was that an element of value was added to the Macht prop-
erty by the lease, which was sufficient to distinguish the Macht
case from the situation where air space is utilized by its owner for
the free flow of light and air. The court held that the lease created
an entity which most closely resembles "a negative easement for
a term of years.' 3 The court explained:
133. The Machts made the intriguing argument not directly treated by the court
that the result of the different treatment of the two types of property is that the City is
only taxing utilized air space.
The basic principle that value is effected by capacity for utilization rather than by
actual utilization is recognized both in the decisions of this Court and in the prac-
tice of the Department of Assessments. . . .The Appellee does not cite a single
case to support the extraordinary proposition that property which has been leased
out for use . . . may be assessed for a higher value than it would be if used by the
owner. ...
Reply Brief of Appellants at 8-10, Macht v. Department of Assessments, 266 Md. 602, 296
A.2d 162 (1972). The answer to this argument is simple. The Macht case can be distin-
guished from the ordinary case of two similar properties, e.g. warehouse space, one leased
and one used by its owner. The distinguishing factor is the easement created by the lease
of March 24, 1971. In all the examples of allegedly similar property cited by Macht, none
were the subject of an appurtenant easement effecting the value of both servient and
dominant fee interests. Following the reasoning of the Machts, once an easement is cre-
ated it should be treated for tax purposes on the basis of its capacity for utilization. Being
a rather unique entity, the easement's capacity for utilization is best measured by its value
to the servient estate, that is, its income value, which is exactly what was done by the
Department of Assessments.
134. See Brief of Appellants at 16, 21, Macht v. Department of Assessments, 266
Md. 602, 296 A.2d 547 (1972).
135. 266 Md. at 611, 296 A.2d at 167.
136. 266 Md. at 612, 296 A.2d at 168.
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So long as the Machts made no use of the air space over their
property, it was not, nor could it be made the subject of an
assessment. Once they denied themselves the use of it for
a price, it took on value for the purposes of assessment, a
value which could be derived by an appraisal based on in-
come, the option price, or both, Bornstein v. State Tax
Comm., 227 Md. 331, 337, 176 A.2d 859 (1962). Concur-
rently, the Blaustein Building, as holder of the estate to
which new rights became appurtenant, has the benefit of an
easement, which could be reflected in its assessable basis,
because the utility of its site was enhanced.
Usually, the existence of an easement diminishes the
value of the servient estate, Engel v. Catucci, 197 F. 2d 597,
600 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Tax Lien Co. v. Schultze, 213 N.Y. 9,
106 N.E. 751 (1914); Nickols, Real Property Taxation of Div-
ided Interests in Land, 11 Kan. L. Rev. 309, 320 (1963);
King, Assessment and Taxation of Easements, 16 Wash. L.
Rev. 36 (1941); 51 Am. Jur. Taxation, § 713 at 660 (1944),
but this is not necessarily so, because there is no relationship
between the amount by which the value of the dominant
estate may be enhanced and the amount by which the value
of the servient estate may be diminished, Bonbright, The
Valuation of Real Estate for Tax Purposes, 34 Colum. L.
Rev. 1397, 1436 (1934). Under certain facts, the value of the
servient estate may not be diminished at all, and may even
be increased, Slatersville Finishing Co. v. Greene, supra, 101
A. at 231.' 31
The significance of characterizing the entity created by the
lease as an easement is that it sufficiently distinguishes the
Machts' tax plight from what the Machts have argued to be simi-
lar untaxed property. If the Machts' air space is the subject of a
negative easement, then it is no longer similar to air space uti-
lized by its owner for the free flow of light and air.' 38 Therefore,
137. 266 Md. at 613-14, 296 A.2d at 168-69.
138. As explained by the court in Engel v. Catucci, 197 F.2d 597 (D.C.C. 1952):
• . . [an easement is an interest in land which has peculiar characteristics of its
own being neither an estate nor a lien, an encumbrance not an equity, in the
ordinary sense of those terms. An easement appurtenant to another lot . . . at-
taches to the possession of that other lot. . . . The owner of the dominant estate
owns the easement. So the owner of the servient estate cannot by conveyance strip
that estate of an easement which has . . . become part of the property right of the
possessor of another parcel of land . . . . We refer to the Restatement of Property,
Division V, Part I, for a full discussion of these underlying considerations. These
special characteristics of an easement appurtenant should carry through into the
tax field. '[T]he appurtenant easement,' as the Restatement says, 'presents a
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the constitutional problem of taxing like property differently
dematerializes.
The major problem with the court's refutation of Macht's
constitutional arguments is that the court was very quick to char-
acterize the entity created by the lease as an easement in order
to distinguish the Macht property from allegedly similar but dif-
ferently taxed property, but failed to go one logical step further
and hold that the principles applicable to the assessment of ease-
ment ought to be applied in this case. Instead, the court skimmed
over the applicability of such principles and simply affirmed the
separate assessment of "Air Rights Only."
In conclusion, the court raised a quasi-estoppel argument
admonishing the Machts for challenging the assessment of the air
space, stating:
It certainly should have been no surprise to the parties
that the practical effect of the lease of the airspace was the
enhancement of the value of the servient estate because of
the rent reserved. In fact, the terms of the agreement are
ample proof that this very result was contemplated. In fixing
the term of the lease at 98 years and nine months, the parties
carefully skirted the provisions of Code (1957, 1969 Repl.
Vol., 1971 Supp.) Art. 81, § 8 (7)(a) which provides that
where a lease is for a term of 99 years or for a shorter term
and perpetually renewable, the leaseholder pays the taxes
just as if he owned the fee. Had the lease been for 99 years,
taxes on the airspace would have been paid by the Blaustein
Building directly, and would not have been included in the
determination of the annual rent.
In setting up the formula upon which the rent was to be
based, the parties carefully stipulated that the base rent was
to be twice the annual real estate taxes on the "entire prop-
erty" at 11-13 East Fayette Street "(land, improvement and
airspace)." There was not only no element of surprise, but
it may well be that the Machts are estopped from denying
that the value of the airspace was an element to be consid-
ered in the assessment process. It seems to us that whether
the value of the airspace was sepatated out or included in the
valuation of the fee for assessment purposes is indeed a dis-
tinction without a difference, so long as the aggregate value
of the components does not exceed the value of the whole.'
situation which calls for exceptional tax treatment. (emphasis supplied).
Id. at 599-600 (footnotes omitted).
139. 266 Md. at 615-16, 296 A.2d at 169-70.
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CONCLUSION
In Macht, the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that air
space leased to an adjoining landowner for the free flow of light
and air may be made the subject of state and local taxation
separately from all other interests in the property to which such
air space is incidental. However,the general principles of assess-
ment and taxation of negative appurtenant easements suggest
that such air space be made the subject of state and local taxation
only to the extent that it effects the interrelated value picture
presented by the dominant and servient estates. From a practical
standpoint, however, these two approaches can produce a sub-
stantially identical dollar valuation result for Macht. The reason
for this is simple; after the assessor reduces the value of the
Macht land a small amount for the self imposed encumbrance,
and then raises that value by an amount determined through
capitalizing the rental paid for the air space, he would have a
dollar value which is substantially the same as the sum of an
assessment of Macht's emcumbered land and a separate assess-
ment of Macht's income producing air space. Therefore, the as-
sessment of Macht's air space at which the Department of Assess-
ment of Baltimore City arrived in the instant case is not entirely
inequitable in light of classic assessment theory, so long as some
reduction is made in value of Macht's land. As a practical matter,
the only difference is that in the instant case, Macht will receive
two tax bills, whereas, in the ideal case, he would receive only
one.
There are, however, three reasons why the result of the in-
stant case, affirming the separate assessment of air space, is less
desirable than the application of the more generally recognized
theory of assessment. First, the fact that the two approaches will
lead the assessor to similar results in the instant case is purely
coincidental. If the value of the servient land were seriously im-
paired by the lease, and the local taxing authority did not adjust
its value accordingly at the same time that it assessed the income
value of the air space, then the taxpayer would be penalized for
his income but not credited with his encumbrance. However, if
the entire servient estate, including the income producing air
space, were assessed at one time, as suggested by the general rule,
then such an inequitable result could never occur.
Second, as discussed earlier, there may very well be a taxable
enhancement to the value of the dominant estate by entering into
such a lease. If the income value of the air rights are assessed
separately to the servient owner, without looking at the entire
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picture, then the taxing authority is doing itself an injustice by
not assessing all taxable value created by the lease.
Third, Judge Barnes made a very good argument in his dis-
sent that it is unconstitutional and against the statutory scheme
of taxation in the State of Maryland to separately assess and tax
air space to the owner of the subjacent tract. It is clear, however,
that it would be perfectly allowable to assess and tax such air
space along with the subjacent tract. One wonders, therefore, why
a questionable procedure must be invented in the great rush to
increase the tax rolls, when conventional methods and classic
general principles of assessment can produce a similar, if not
better, tax result for the community.
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